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Abstract 
 
Theory of rational voting states that, with positive voting costs, people would vote only when they 
are pivotal. This hypothesis is contradicted by the frequent observation of relatively high rates of 
electoral turnout. In the last decades several solutions to the paradox have been investigated. Within 
a behavioral approach, studies suggest that dynamics emerging in a group may induce its members 
to conform to cooperative or ethical behavior and consequently encourage voting participation. 
Such dynamics remind the source of social capital defined by Bourdieu (1986) as “the nature of the 
social obligations, connections, and networks available to you”. In this paper we investigate the 
influence of social interaction and cultural consumption on voting turnout using data from British 
Household Panel Surve. The analysis highlights the role of hierarchical groups on electoral 
participation as well as the effect of residential  mobility in weakining social connections. 
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1. Introduction 
Fully rational behavior implies that, with strictly positive voting costs, people would vote 
only when they are pivotal. In fact, from Downs (1957), each voter preferring a candidate, 
votes if and only if expected utility from victory of the preferred candidate is higher than 
voting costs. But if individuals are rational and voting is purely instrumental to obtain the 
preferred electoral outcome, voting turnout in large elections should be very low,  because 
the probability of being pivotal approximates zero as the number of potential voters 
increases. However, this hypothesis is rejected by the frequent observation that voting is 
definitely more common than abstaining in democratic systems. A substantial literature has 
provided several potential solutions to the voting paradox. Some approaches abandon the 
assumption of fully rational forward looking voters and assume bounded rationality. Other 
models keep rationality but associate a benefit to the act of voting itself (expressive voting 
approach).
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 A different group of models, the group-based models, operate within the realm 
of full rationality and focus on the probability for a voter of being pivotal when he or she 
belongs to a group adopting a common behavior in voting.
2
 Within the latter category of 
models we find This study, represing a work in progress, is an exploratory attempt to  
improve our understanding of the environment where group-based voting particiaption is 
more likely to emerge. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevance 
of group-based behavior. Section 3 shows the data used in the regression. Section 4 explains 
the estimated model. Section 5 presents some preliminary results. Section 6 concludes the 
paper with few comments about the analysis that has been conducted.     
 
 
2. Group-based models of voting and social capital 
One of the most interesting and promising attempt to solve the paradox is based on the 
analysis of individual behavior within formal as well as informal groups. Starting from 
Uhlaner (1989), group-based models represent a path explored to reconcile the theory with 
                                          
1
 The main limit of this approach is its tautological evidence, as  individuals end up voting when they feel they should 
vote. other solutions, within the fully rational framework,  predicting a positive levels of turnout include the game -
theoretical models (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983; 1985), info-based models (Larcinese, 2006) and group-based models 
(Ulhaner, 1989; Feddersen 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006; Fowler, 2005).  
2 Surveys of rational solutions are provided, among others, by Blais (2000), Mueller (2003) and Geys (2006).  
2 
 
observed voting patterns. In Uhlaner (1989), groups are large enough to be pivotal and 
candidates do not share the same position in the political dimension. Morton (1991) 
develops the group-based approach by examining turnout equilibria in a strategic model 
with risk adverse voters. Voting as a strategic participation game incorporating groups is 
also analyzed by Schram and van Winden (1991) and Schram and Sonnemans (1996ab), 
which divide group members in opinion leaders and pressure consumers and consider both 
inter-groups and intra-groups correlations. As in former models, the basic intuition refers to 
the ability of groups to be pivotal in elections. Evidences of higher turnout rates associated 
with group membership and intra-group communication are provided in a laboratory 
experiment (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996ab). Feddersen (2004) distinguishes between 
“group-based voting models of mobilization” and “group -based ethical voter models”. 
Mobilization models highlight the relations within a group, especially between leaders and 
followers, to explain how leaders’ efforts may determine high turnout levels among group’s 
members. Group-based ethical models assume instead that individuals are motivated to 
participate in elections by a sense of civic duty or ethical obligations (see also Feddersen 
and Sandroni, 2006) and by evaluations at aggregate level, as in traditional ethical models. 
Nevertheless, group membership effect might hide the infulence of social interactions. For 
example, Fowler (2005) assumes that  a single act of voting affects a number of individuals 
that are linked together by social connections (turnout cascade effect) and shows that 
ideological homogeneity amplifies the turnout cascade effect.  
Group-based collective action is also addressed by Bourdieu (1986) in the definition of 
social capital as “the nature of the social obligations, connections, and networks available to 
you”. Networks of relationships are the result of individual investments transforming 
occasional into relationship implying durable obligations. Such obligations may include 
cooperating in activities that affect group welfare, such as voting. 
This paper aims at contributing to the previous literature by investigating the forms of social 
activities and interactions able to reinforce intra-group communication and sense of 
obligation that may ultimately lead to some cooperative behavior, voting in this case.  In 
order to do so, we consider the impact on voting participation of various forms of group 
memberships. They require different intensities of obligations and individual ‘investments’ 
to stay in the group, which help to reinforce social relationships. We would expect that 
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social interaction per se would not be significant for collective action. In other words, the  
mere participation to a group that is low-demanding, with no specific ethical, political or 
cultural connotation (e.g. sport clubs) would not contribute to accumulate social capital in 
the same way as membership in a religious or political group. Moreover, latter groups have 
a hierarchical structure (leader and followers) that, according to models of group 
mobilization, may spur collective action in a group. Results confirm this hypothesis. Social 
interaction has no significant impact on voting participation unlikely groups characterized 
by some deep bond, such as political or religious faith. 
We also verify whether cultural expenditure has an impact of voting. The reasons for this 
examination are twofold. First, cultural consumption may favor social interaction and even 
group membership. Second, several studies already include education as a voting predictor 
(see Mueller, 2003). Therefore, we expect that cultural consumption related to education 
will have a positive impact on voting. Again, results confirm the hypothesis. Moreover we 
find that not any kind of cultural expenditure is influent.  Theater attendance has a 
significant impact while going to see a movie does not. We suggest that such a result can be 
further understood by referring to the concept of cultural capital in its “embodied state”, as a 
process of accumulation that “implies a labor of inculcation and assimilation, costs time, 
time which must be invested personally by the investor” (Bourdieu 1986). Theatre 
attendance, in this sense, represents in our opinion a better proxy for such a voluntary 
accumulation process than cinema attendance, since the latter can be included within the 
concept of mass consumption.   
Finally, we consider the effect of residential mobility. Moving to a different residence can 
weaken your bonds and participation to a specific group, at least in the short run. In the 
medium-long run old (or new) links to old (or new) groups of equal or different kinds are 
likely to form again. Results confirm this hypothesis showing that changing residence 
affects voting participation within the first year but not later.
3
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 Moving may imply registration delays. In the UK, voting offices make a yearly check about residence. This means 
that you may not be listed as a voter if you moved recently without informing the public office. 
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3. Data description  
Data for the analysis are from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is a 
longitudinal study of persons living in Great Britain based on household units. It includes 
more than 9000 individuals and household for eighteen waves (1991-2008). The BHPS does 
not provide much information about political attitudes that are usually include in Political 
datasets. We use the subsample of those who are eligible to vote in the electoral cycle 1997 -
2001. BHPS includes only individuals who live in households while those who live in 
institutions are excluded and this can be considered the first possible source of bias.  
According to Uhrig (2008), attrition occurs mainly between the first two waves while it is 
negligible in the rest of the panel set. However, as our research question refers to e lections 
according to in-time characteristics there are no reasons for using information belonging to 
the first wave. In the following table we present variables description and summary 
statistics.  
 
Table1. Summary statistics and variable descriptions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
       
Turn 15889 0.739946 0.438678 0 1 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if respondent voted at last 
election and 0 otherwise 
Lagturn 15889 0.763295 0.425073 0 1 The lag of variable turnout 
Sportclub 15889 0.166971 0.372962 0 1 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if respondent is a member of a 
sport club 
Religroup 15889 0.146705 0.353823 0 1 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if respondent is a member of 
religious group 
Union m. 15889 0.167663 0.373579 0 1 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if respondent is a member of a 
trade or labor union 
Moved 15889 0.072314 0.259016 0 1 
 
Theatre 15889 0.359494 0.479867 0 1 
Dummy taking value 1 if respondent declared to attend 
theatrical representation several times a year 
Cinema 15889 0.115363 0.319469 0 1 
Dummy taking value 1 if respondent declared to attend cinema  
several times a year 
Voluntary 
activity 15889 0.160866 0.367419 0 1 
Dummy taking value 1 if respondent declared to attend 
voluntary not paid activities several times a year 
Eat out 15889 0.555415 0.496935 0 1 
Dummy taking value 1 if responded declared to eat out several 
times a year. 
Education 15889 2.06923 0.59717 1 3 
A set of three dummies: high education (ISCED 5-6), 
intermediate (ISCED 3-4), low education (ISCED 0-2). 
 
Marital 
status 15889 2.103971 1.748295 1 6 
 
 
Set of dummies indicating marital status 
Female 15889 0.549689 0.497541 0 1 Gender 
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job status 15889 2.659135 1.164251 1 5 
 
Set of dummy variables indicating respondent job status: self 
employed, in paid employ, unemployed, retired, other 
Region 15889 11.01573 6.406731 1 19 Set of dummies 
Ethnic 
group 15889 1.052426 0.355801 1 4 Set of dummies 
Age 15889 48.95733 15.27802 22 70 
A set of three class of age dummies ( age<30; 30<age<65; 
age>65)  
Interest in 
politics 15889 2.276544 0.888017 1 4 
 
Set of dummies indicating respondent's self reported leve of 
interest in politics 
 
 
4. Model specification 
Consider the following generic logit model: 
 
yit*=β1yt-1+β2xi+β3Dit+εit      (1) 
 
where yit* is individual latent pseudo-propensity to vote; yt-1 is the lagged dependent variable 
(i.e. the observed voter behaviour at time t-1); xit  is a set of individual characteristics; Dit is 
a set of dummies indicating groups’ membership and leisure  activities; and εit is the random 
component. An individual votes if her pseudo propensity is positive: yi =1 if yi*>0. We 
estimate the models as a pooled logit and allow for observations to be correlated within 
households. 
In order to determine the impact of group membership and activity we estimate a set of 4 
models. In model 1 we estimate a null model that does not include any D variable. In model 
2 we add three variables indicating group membership. We consider religious groups  and  
trade unions as hierarchical groups, and sport clubs as informal group. In model 3 we 
include a set of dummies indicating individual leisure activities. We consider the attendance 
to theatrical representation, voluntary unpaid activities, the attendance to cinema, and a 
dummy indicating whether respondents frequently get out with friends for dinner. Finally in 
model 4, we aim at considering the effect of residential mobility on turnout.  In order to do 
so we add two other variables: moved is a dummy taking value 1 if respondent moved to the 
present address in the last year. The second variable l-moved indicates if respondent had 
moved to the present address at t-1.  
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As controls, we use educational level dummies, job status (6 dummies), region (3 
dummies), marital status (6 dummies), gender, class of age and self reported interest in 
politics (see table 1 for variable description).  
We perform the usual link test for specification and the Hosmer-Lemenshow goodness-of-
fit test. We also Perform a Box-Tidwell estimation in order to check if any predictor 
transformations is needed. A test on the random effects estimation confirm the assumption 
of no correlation across observations for each individual.
4
 Finally we reastimate the models 
by using survey weights in order to check if results hold. 
 
 
5. Results 
We discuss the outcomes in terms of group membership effect and leisure activity effect. 
Model 1 is the baseline model
5
. In model 2 we add groups membership in the model 
specification, finding that only religious group and union membership are statistically 
significant. On the contrary, being a member of a sport club does not affect turnout 
propensity. We interpret such a result by considering the higher intensity of obligation 
related to hierarchical groups than informal groups. As we expected, low-demanding groups 
do not affect cooperative attitudes nor political participation. Religious groups and unions 
are characterized by political and cultural connotation as well as a hierarchical structure that 
strenghten social interactions and favor mobilization. 
The same logic applies to model 3. In this case we consider leisure activities also. Once 
again, if the hypothesis of social interactions holds we would expect all the leisure variables 
to have an effect on voting propensity. Here only attendance to theatre and voluntary unpaid 
activities have a positive and statistically significant effect on turnout probability. Our 
interpretation on these results is twofold: on the one side, we suggest that the positive and 
significant effect of voluntary activities highlights the role of prosocial behavior that is a 
coherent with cooperative attitudes. On the other side, the positive effect of attendance to 
theatre underlines the existance of both social capital and cultural capital as a result of a 
process of accumulation and embodiment that cannot be reducted to the level of education.  
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 Models 2, 3 and 4 pass specification and goodness of fit test. Test outcomes, Box-Tidwell estimations, correlation 
matrix, weighted and subsample estimations can be provided upon request. 
5
 Note that the model is correctly specified, according to the link test, but it suffers from a poor goodness of fit 
according to the Hosmer- Lemenshow test.  
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  Table 2. Estimation outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES turn turn turn turn 
     
Sport club  0.0822 0.0561 0.0548 
  (0.0638) (0.0641) (0.0644) 
Religious group  0.346*** 0.297*** 0.299*** 
  (0.0774) (0.0797) (0.0803) 
Union membership  0.255*** 0.248*** 0.232*** 
  (0.0656) (0.0658) (0.0658) 
Moved    -0.747*** 
    (0.0903) 
Moved at t-1    0.0167 
    (0.0773) 
Eat out   -0.0528 -0.0533 
   (0.0779) (0.0783) 
Theatre   0.222*** 0.230*** 
   (0.0532) (0.0534) 
Cinema   0.0520 0.0676 
   (0.0525) (0.0527) 
Voluntary activities   0.120* 0.125* 
   (0.0708) (0.0714) 
High educated 0.310*** 0.264*** 0.209*** 0.249*** 
 (0.0742) (0.0748) (0.0752) (0.0768) 
Low educated -0.0857 -0.0427 0.000502 0.00869 
 (0.0605) (0.0611) (0.0627) (0.0626) 
Age<30 -0.468*** -0.449*** -0.441*** -0.386*** 
 (0.0557) (0.0561) (0.0568) (0.0582) 
Age>65 0.417*** 0.412*** 0.411*** 0.405*** 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) 
Lag turnout 1.905*** 1.893*** 1.893*** 1.896*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0494) (0.0496) (0.0506) 
Constant 0.305 0.199 0.136 0.168 
 (0.294) (0.298) (0.300) (0.306) 
Other controls (see 
table 1) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 15,889 15,889 15,889 15,889 
r2_p 0.264 0.267 0.268 0.273 
chi2 3129 3149 3147 3130 
Link test Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hosmer Lemenshow  No Yes Yes Yes 
 Clustered (by households) standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The attendance to theatre, in our opinion shows the individual investment in such a process. 
One may argue that going to watch a movie has a monetary cost as well as going to theatre. 
Neverthless the former represents a type of mass consumption that cannot be included in 
that “work of acquisition [that] is work on oneself (self-improvement), an effort that 
presupposes a personal cost (on paie de sa personne, as we say in French), an investment, 
above all of time” (Bourdieu, 1986).  
Finally, in model 4 we study the effect of residential mobility on turnout probability. Results 
confirm our expectations: if a voter moves to a new house during an election year her 
probability to vote is lower. This effect disappears after one year. We would interpret this 
result by arguing that residential mobility weakens social interactions and so affects 
cooperative behavior. However, the cost of voting includes now the cost (also in terms of 
time) of registration on the electoral rolls. In United Kindom, local electoral offices deliver 
registration forms each year (between May and November) to every house in order to 
mantain electoral registry. Election takes place generally in May so it is technically possible 
that a voter moves in an election year and, as a result, she is not registered on the roll.   
 
 
6. Concluding comments 
Our study should be interpreted as an exploratory analysis of the impact of social capital and 
cultural capital on a specific collective action, namely participation to vote.  Preliminary 
results however encourage further analysis, in our view. In particular we find clear evidence 
that social capital built through investments in group activities has an impact on 
participation especially when this groups have an estabilished hierarchical structure. This 
result supports confirms the hypothesis derived by group mobilization models and is also 
consistent with definition of social capital by Bourdieu (1986). Also his definition of 
cultural capital offers an insightful interpretation of the observed difference in voting 
participation between theater and movie attendances. Our further efforts will be devoted to 
better define the behavioral dynamics within the group in order to reach more precise and 
testable hypotheses.   
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Data source.  
University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research, British Household Panel 
Survey: Waves 1-15, 1991-2006 [computer file]. 3rd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data 
Archive [distributor], June 2007. SN: 5151. 
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